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SUMMARY 
Using a sample of 1,385 firm year observations collected for UK nonfinancial listed firms on 
the LSE FTSE ALL SHARES index, this paper investigates the effect of geographic 
proximity between auditors and their clients, and auditor industry specialization on the 
reporting of goodwill impairment over the period from 2006 ± 2014. Results show a strongly 
significant positive relationship between geographic distance, measure by log of miles, and 
both the likelihood and magnitude of unexpected goodwill impairment. This indicates that the 
greater the distance between audit firm and the client headquarter, the greater information 
asymmetry and the less likely that auditors might control management from manipulating the 
impairment test and reporting more/less goodwill impairment than it should be. Interestingly, 
when the auditor is specialized, his expertise and knowledge helps to reduce the information 
asymmetry problems and become better able to challenge the management on the estimates 
and assumptions they have used, and thus constrain them from using goodwill impairment as 
a tool for managing their earnings. However, aXGLWRUV¶ specialization is moderating this 
relationship only when auditors are classified as being specialized on the regional level, 
demonstrating that knowledge and expertise are shared only between audit partners and 
offices located in the same region, and not expanded to others located outside that region. 
Keywords: Goodwill impairment, auditor specialization, geographic distance, board 
diversity 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The increased importance of goodwill as well as the problems associated with its recognition 
and valuation has derived accounting organizations and professional bodies to issue set of 
accounting standards related to the fair presentation of this asset. The early set of standards 
required goodwill to be amortized over an assumed life of not more than 20 years. However, 
in 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) released SFAS No. (142) that 
required goodwill to be annually tested for impairment rather than amortized.  
In addition, in 2004, IAS 36 require Goodwill to be tested also at least annually for 
impairment. Due to an increasing demand for harmonized global financial accounting, the 
IASB issued International Financial Reporting Standard IFRS 3 ³%XVLQHVV&RPELQDWLRQV´LQ
2004, which applied the same accounting treatment for goodwill issued by the IAS 36 and 
required UK firms listed on the main London Stock Exchange to adopt IFRSs starting from 
January 2005. 
Companies recognize and record goodwill when they do mergers or acquisitions and pay 
more than the fair value of net identifiable assets acquired. Following IFRS 3, all UK 
companies listed on the London stock exchange are required to review their recorded 
goodwill at least annually for impairment2 to make sure that the recorded amount of goodwill 
is not exceeding its fair value. However, the majority of studies on the determinants of 
goodwill impairment have outlined that managers use the discretion inherent in the reporting 
of goodwill impaired opportunistically, for the purpose achieving their own interests (Beatty 
and Weber, 2006; Glaum et al., 2015; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2009; Laurion et al., 2014; Li 
and Sloan, 2015; Li et al., 2011; Masters-Stout et al., 2008; Ramanna and Watts, 2012; Zang, 
2008). 
Due to the substantial value of recognized goodwill as a percentage to the total assets 
recorded in the balance sheet (ex: 80% of the total assets in some companies), problems 
related to its consequent measurement, and the increasing number of companies recording 
and impairing goodwill (Chen et al., 2015), the objective of this paper is to investigate the 
effect audit quality, measured through the geographic proximity between auditors and their 
clients, and auditor industry specialization on the reporting of goodwill impairment in the 
United Kingdom over the period from 2006 ± 2014. 
                                                          
2
 Impairment is defined as a reduction in the value of asset and is calculated by the difference between the asset 
book value and its fair value if the book value is higher. 
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This research makes several contributions to the literature in goodwill impairment and audit 
quality. It is one of the first studies that examine the effect of auditor industry specialization 
in the UK on the reporting of goodwill impairment, LQYHVWLJDWLQJ ZKHWKHU DXGLWRUV¶
knowledge and expertise are shared between audit partners and offices on a national or a 
regional level. Moreover, it is one of the first studies that explore the effect of geographic 
distance between auditors and clients in the UK on the quality of audit provided, and the 
effect of auditor industry specialization as a moderator variable on this relationship. This 
research is of much interest to regulators, policy makers, audit firms, and investors. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reflects a quick review of the 
literature in goodwill impairment and audit quality, followed by a development for the 
research hypotheses. Variables measurements and model specification are presented in 
section 3, followed by a description for the sample selection and some descriptive statistics in 
section 4. Finally, section 5 presents the results and the conclusion. 
2. EXTANT LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Literature on the Determinants of Goodwill Impairment 
Studies on the determinants of goodwill impairment started to take place after the 
introduction of both the SFAS No.142 in the US in 2001, and Section 3062 of the CICA 
Handbook in Canada in 2002. (Beatty and Weber, 2006) is one of the earliest studies that 
show that managers normally tend to increase the amounts of goodwill written off in the 
transition period that are considered as a change in the accounting policy (below the line) 3, 
and act opportunistically to decrease the likelihood of recognizing future goodwill 
impairments that will be reported above the line and consequently affect the company 
income. Furthermore, companies are less likely to write off goodwill if their debt covenants 
have little slack and the covenants react to accounting changes. On the other hand, they are 
more likely to impair goodwill in the adoption period, if their CEOs had a short tenure, they 
are riskier, and they have higher earnings response coefficients on income from continuing 
operations. 
                                                          
3
 When implementing SFAS 142 for the first time, firms could decide whether to write down the goodwill 
UHFRUGHG LQ WKHLU EDODQFH VKHHWV LPPHGLDWH ³KLW´ WR WKHLU EDODQFH VKHHW ZLWKRXW DIIHFWLQJ FXUUHQW UHSRUWHG
earnings). This initial impairment was reported below the line, whereas any future impairments would be taken 
above the line included in income from continuing operations (Hussainey et al., 2013). 
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In a similar study, Jordan and Clark (2011) find that companies recording goodwill 
impairment show lower level of earnings compared to their counterparts from the non-
impairment group. Furthermore, companies reporting negative earnings from the impairment 
group are found to have significant negative earnings than their counterparts.They argue that 
companies try to accelerate the recording of goodwill impairment in the same implementation 
year (2002) as a change in the accounting principles instead of recording it as an operating 
expense in subsequent years, and hence increase future earnings. Sevin and Schroeder (2005) 
extend the work done by Jordan and Clark (2011) and report that small firms are charging 
goodwill impairments more than large firms. 
Providing an evidence for a different earnings management strategy,  Long (2005) finds that 
US companies are not reporting impairment on a timely basis in the initial implementation of 
SFAS No. 142, as they try to minimize the reported impairment losses to smooth income and 
to avoid the violation of debt covenants. Covering the same period, Zang (2008), also, finds a 
significant negative relationship between leverage levels and the recorded goodwill 
impairment losses for a sample of 870 US companies. This result is robust to different 
measures of leverage that reflect the strictness of debt covenants. Similar to (Beatty and 
Weber, 2006), Zang (2008) argues that leveraged firms are less likely to record impairment 
losses when their covenants include the effect of accounting changes and restrictions on 
retained earnings and net assets than when their covenants exclude accounting changes or do 
not have such restrictions. 
Furthermore, Hayn and Hughes (2006) study the possibility of predicting goodwill 
impairments for US firms. They conclude that investors face considerable difficulty in 
predicting goodwill impairments. They argue that the poor quality of relevant disclosures 
concerning the post-acquisition performance of acquired business units was the main reason 
for poor predictability of impairments. They also conclude that there was a tendency for 
many goodwill impairments to be taken only after considerable delay. For their sample of the 
post SFAS 142 acquisition, they conclude that the adoption of SFAS 142 is less likely to 
improve the quality of financial reports in forecasting goodwill write-offs. 
Likewise, while examining the timeliness of the reported goodwill impairment for a sample 
from 1996 to 2011, thus covering both the pre- and post-SFAS 142 periods, Li and Sloan 
(2015) find that goodwill impairments in the post-SFAS 142 period lag deteriorating 
operating performance and stock returns by at least three years. They conclude that goodwill 
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impairment does not reflect the economics of the business, as firms act opportunistically and 
belatedly recognize their losses; in their view the new impairment rules in SFAS 142 are 
ineffective in achieving timely impairments. 
Moreover, Ramanna and Watts (2012) study a sample of US firms for which there is a high 
likelihood of goodwill impairment. Only 69% of the research sample reports goodwill 
impairment. They find no evidence that manager had positive inside information about future 
cash flows, and some evidence that impairments may have been avoided for opportunistic 
reasons related to CEO compensation, CEO reputation, and debt-covenant violation concerns. 
They also find some evidence that the non-impairments in their sample may be explained by 
PDQDJHUV¶IOH[LELOLW\SURYLded under the SFAS 142. 
Using a sample of 38,667 firm-year observations for US companies over the period from 
2003 to 2011, Filip et al. (2015) show that firms postponing goodwill impairment in their 
accounting books manage their current levels of cash flows upward, compared to firms that 
recognize an impairment loss, using different proxies of cash flow management. This pattern 
of unexpected positive cash flows suggests that managers are manipulating current cash flows 
to support their choice not to report impairment loss in financial statements. Furthermore, 
they report that non-impairers that are likely to carry impaired goodwill exhibit a lower 
change in future operating performance, present lower future stock returns and cumulated 
abnormal returns than impairers over one-to-two years after impairment avoidance. These 
results are consistent with the argument that these unexpectedly high levels of current cash 
flows of firms that delayed impairment are detrimental to future performance. 
Regarding studies that examine the IFRS context, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) examine 
whether the discretion involved in the reporting of goodwill impairment under the IFRS 3 
Business combinations has been used as was intended by IASB to signal informative 
information or opportunistically to reflect management incentives. The research sample 
consists of 528 firm-year observations from the largest 500 UK listed companies (based on 
their market capitalization) for the years 2005 and 2006. As predicted, a multivariate tobit 
regression analysis finds an association between goodwill impairments and recent CEO 
changes, Big Bath, and Income smoothing; with the CEO change and Income smoothing 
affect positively, while the Big Bath affect negatively. Moreover, this supports the notion that 
managers are using the discretion in the recording of goodwill impairment, however, further 
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analysis shows that this discretion is more likely to be used to signal private information 
about the company performance rather than being used opportunistically. 
%\ FRQVLGHULQJ WKH LPSDFW RI WKH JOREDO ILQDQFLDO FULVLV RQ D ILUP¶V EHKDYLRU GXULQJ WKH
financial crisis in Australia, Vanza et al. (2011) find that both CEO change and debt 
contracting are associated with reported impairment according to IFRS 3 for a sample of 
5,884 firm year observations pertaining to 647 firms exhibiting indicators of impairment. 
Similarly, Hamberg et al. (2011) find that tenured management is negatively associated with 
the impairment decision based on Swedish data pertaining to all firms listed at the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange in 2001 to 2007. 
Hussainey et al. (2013) extend the work done be AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) through using a 
large sample of UK listed companies that covers the period from 2001 to 2009, therefore 
includes the effect of the financial crisis. Results show that current period bad news in the 
stock price, high opening goodwill relative to the market value of equity, firm size, more 
focused business, inside ownership, and CEO change are the main drivers for goodwill 
impairments in the UK. Moreover, the reporting of goodwill impairment was found to be 
quite timely as no significant relationship exit between lagged return or lagged bad return and 
the recorded impairments. 
However, Glaum et al. (2015) find that the likelihood of reporting goodwill impairment is 
associated with lagged stock market return, suggesting that firms tend to delay necessary 
impairment. However, further investigations reveal that the timeliness of goodwill 
impairment depends on the strength of national accounting and auditing enforcement 
systems: firms in countries with strong enforcement systems tend to write off goodwill in a 
timely fashion, both before and after the Financial Crisis, while firms in countries with weak 
enforcement systems tend to delay necessary goodwill impairments. Moreover, they find that 
ILUPV¶GHFLVLRQVWRLPSDLUJRRGZLOODUHQRWRQO\UHODWHGWRPHDVXUHVRISHUIRUPDQFHEXWDOVR
to proxies for managerial and firm level incentives (such as CEO tenure, income smoothing, 
WKHQXPEHURIILUPV¶RSHUDWLQJVHJPHQWVDQGWRILUPV¶RZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUHV 
Furthermore, based on a sample of 538 Spanish-listed firm-year observations corresponding 
to the period 2005±2011, Giner and Pardo (2014) H[DPLQH PDQDJHUV¶ XVH RI GLVFUHWLRQ LQ
deciding whether or not to impair goodwill and about the magnitude of the impairment. 
Results show that Big Bath and Income Smooth explain the decision to impair and the 
magnitude decision, respectively. They also argue that Firm size is an attribute that appears 
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significant in all the analyses, suggesting that the cost and complexity of running the tests 
aIIHFW PDQDJHUV¶ GHFLVLRQV thus, larger firms appear to be more prone to recording 
impairment and to impairing larger amounts than smaller firms are. 
On the other hand, Carlin et al. (2010); Carlin and Finch (2015); Laili and Khairi (2013); and 
Stokes and Webster (2009) examine the effect of the audit quality, using the auditor brand 
name (Big 4 versus Non-Big 4) as a proxy, on the degree to which companies are strictly 
following and implementing the IFRS standards while measuring and reporting their 
goodwill impairment losses. 
Carlin et al. (2010), Carlin and Finch (2015), and Laili and Khairi (2013) explore this effect 
on the compliance level of the Singaporean, Hong Kong, and Malaysian listed companies, 
respectively, with the goodwill impairment disclosures requirements imposed by IFRS. 
Carlin et al., (2010) show that companies audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 failed to even 
adhere to the basic disclosure requirements. Following the same methodology used by Carlin 
et al. (2010), Laili and Khairi (2013) find no significant differences in the audit quality 
among the Big 3 auditors. This indicates that audit quality among the largest audit firms is 
homogenous, as has so often been assumed in the literature. However, consistent with Carlin 
et al. (2010), companies failed to comply with even the basic elements of the Standard in 
relation to goodwill impairment testing.  
Moreover, Carlin and Finch (2015) find that audit quality is higher for Big 4 than non-Big 4 
auditors, as levels of non-compliance and poor disclosure quality pertaining to goodwill 
impairment of other audit firm clients were higher than that of Big 4 audit firm clients. 
However, on the one hand clients of Deloitte were found to be the best practice disclosure 
bearing on goodwill impairment testing process. On the other hand, clients of E&Y, KPMG, 
PWC and other audit firms were evaluated to have substantial variations of practice 
disclosures relating to method employed, CGU aggregation and discount rates and growth 
rates. This indicates that the quality of an audit among Big 4 audit firms is not homogeneous 
as has been accepted before, but is subject to variation. 
To examine the effect of audit quality on the relevance and timeliness of goodwill 
impairment reported, Stokes and Webster (2009) use a sample from companies that are listed 
on the Australian stock exchange during the period from 1999 to 2008, covering both the area 
before and after the introduction of the IFRS, and following the same methodology used by 
Chalmers et al. (2011) and Godfrey and Koh (2009). They find companies that have been 
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audited by Big 4 auditors are more likely to report goodwill impairments that reflect the 
underlying economic value of goodwill and their investment opportunities (IOS) than other 
companies that have been audited by non-Big 4 auditors. Findings demonstrate more 
explanatory power for the Big 4 model (R2 = 46%) than the non-Big 4 one ((R2 = 32%), with 
a significant negative relationship exists only in the big 4 audit firms sample between the 
reported impairment losses and their IOS.  
Moreover, Chen et al. (2015) present the effect of monitoring tools, such as: audit quality 
(measured through auditor industry specialization); and institutional ownership (reflects the 
percentage of shares owned by institutions), on the market participants decisions following 
the disclosure of goodwill impairment. They find the amounts of goodwill impairment are 
QHJDWLYHO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK DQDO\VWV¶ IRUHFDVW DFFXUDF\ DQG SRVLWLYHO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKHLU
forecast dispersion, because of the uncertainty surrounding goodwill impairments. However, 
with a more specialized auditor and greater institutional ownership, the uncertainty relating to 
goodwill impairments is decreasing and consequently the adverse effect of goodwill 
impairments on analyst forecast dispersion is decreasing as well. 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Geographic Distance Between the Auditor and the Client 
Recent finance studies suggest that information asymmetry increases with the physical 
distance between investors and their targets. In a seminal paper by Coval and Moskowitz 
(2001), the authors find that mutual fund managers earn higher returns on investments in 
local versus non-local firms, and attribute their findings to local analysts having better 
monitoring capabilities and/or better access to private information. Similarly, using a sample 
of over 6,000 business acquisitions, Uysal et al. (2008) shows that in the context of mergers 
and acquisitions, acquirers have a preference for local targets and earn significantly higher 
returns on local transactions versus non-local transactions. 
In the auditing literature, Choi et al. (2012) document that auditor±client proximity has a 
positive effect on audit quality as they improve accrual quality. Specifically, they show that 
clients of local auditors report a higher level of accrual quality compared to clients of non-
local auditors4. They suggest that geographic proximity provides auditors with an 
                                                          
4
 7KH\ GHILQH DQ DXGLWRU DV D ORFDO DXGLWRU  LI WKH DXGLWRU¶V SUDFWLFLQJ RIILFH LV ORFDWHG LQ WKH VDPH
PHWURSROLWDQVWDWLVWLFDODUHD06$DVWKHFOLHQW¶VKHDGTXDUWHUVDQGLIWKHJHRJUDSKLFGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKH
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informational advantage that facilitates a more effective monitoring of client managers, 
possibly because of common media markets, increased awareness of local business 
conditions, common social networks, or easier access to client personnel. Moreover, Jensen et 
al. (2015) document that accruals quality improves with auditor proximity, however, 
geographic distance imposes additional costs on auditors that could require additional client 
screening protocols. This results in audit fees increase with client distance, possibly as 
compensation for the increased costs incurred by auditors contracting with far away clients. 
Existing research has also found that geographic proximity to governing bodies, such as an 
SEC office, has implications for auditees and their external auditors. DeFond et al. (2015) 
find evidence suggesting that non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to issue going concern 
opinions for clients headquartered in cities with SEC regional offices, possibly because of 
risk protection behaviour by auditors. Furthermore, Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) argue that the 
SEC is more likely to investigate firms located closer to its offices, as they find that 
companies located more than 100 km from an SEC office are more likely to restate their 
financial statements. 
Moreover, chen et al. (2016) show a positive association between auditor±client geographic 
distance and internal control weakness, that is weaker for firms with longer auditor tenure. 
These results suggest that auditor rotation policies could deprive the auditor of client specific 
knowledge, especially for auditors located further away from their clients. On the contrary, a 
another study done by López and Rich (2016) on the effect of geographic distance, measured 
as the driving distance between U.S. municipalities and their external auditors, on the 
likelihood and severity of municipal internal control weaknesses finds evidence of a positive 
association between the disclosure of internal control exceptions and driving distance, 
suggesting that audit rigor is greater for geographically distant clients. They argue that this 
could be an indication of greater independence due to reduced political or economic ties 
between auditors and their local municipal leaders. 
In sum, these studies indicate that geographic proximity mitigates information asymmetries 
and enhances monitoring effectiveness. Therefore, based on the above arguments, it is 
expected that shorter auditor±client geographic distance helps auditors develop better 
knowledge about client-specific industry, resulting in being more effective in constraining 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
WZR FLWLHV ZKHUH WKH DXGLWRU¶V SUDFWLFLQJ RIILFH DQG WKH FOLHQW¶V KHDGTXDUWHUV DUH ORFDWHG LV ZLWKLQ 
kilometres, or they are in the same MSA. 
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managers from using estimates to report unexpected positive/negative goodwill impairment. 
Thus, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Shorter auditor±client geographic distance is associated with lower unexpected 
goodwill impairment. 
Next, this paper posits that longer auditor±client geographic distance would have less 
significant effect on the reporting of unexpected goodwill impairment if the auditor is 
classified as being specialized in the client industry. This assumes that specialized auditors 
have the level of knowledge and experience that enable them to understand the client 
business more effectively that non-specialized ones, and therefore, reduce the risk of 
information asymmetry that might result when auditors are located far away from the client. 
Therefore, industry specialized auditors are better able to evaluate the estimates and the 
assumptions that managers use in the calculation of goodwill impairment than non-
specialized auditors located at the same distance from their clients. This leads to the second 
hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The positive relation between auditor±client geographic distance and Unexpected 
goodwill impairment is weaker when the auditor is specialized in the client industry. 
Recent research has begun exploring if industry reputations of Big 4 accounting firms are the 
result of office-level industry leadership in specific cities rather tKDQDILUP¶VQDWLRQDO-level 
industry leadership based on its total clientele (Bills et al., 2013; Carson and Fargher, 2007; 
Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Fung et al., 2012; Minutti-Meza, 2013; Reichelt 
and Wang, 2010). Therefore, the underlying issue is whether Big 4 industry expertise is a 
firm- wide phenomenon or a more localized office-specific phenomenon. Ferguson et al. 
(2003) argue that reputations are more likely to be firm-wide if the industry expertise of 
office-based professionals can be captured and distributed to other offices of the firms 
through knowledge sharing practices. Alternatively, reputations are more likely to be office-
specific if industry expertise is closely tied to office-based professionals who primarily 
service clients headquartered in the same locale.  
In the UK, Basioudis and Francis (2007) and McMeeking et al. (2006) provide an evidence 
that auditors receive significant fee premiums if they are defined as specialized on the city 
level, not the national level. This indicates that specialized auditors receive higher premium 
because they are assumed to provide higher audit quality than non-specialized auditors, and 
industry expertise of office-based professionals are not shared and distributed to other offices 
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of the firms through knowledge sharing practices. However, if auditor specialization in the 
UK is not shared across the country, and hence specialization on the national level has not 
shown significant effect on the audit fees premium, it might be that auditor knowledge and 
expertise are shared and distributed between audit firm office located in the same UK 
regions. This is because UK cities located in each region are close to each other (compared to 
US) and hence knowledge and expertise can be easily shared between offices in the same 
region. 
Therefore, the second research hypothesis is empirically tested through two sub hypotheses: 
H2a: The positive relation between auditor±client geographic distance and 
Unexpected goodwill impairment is weaker when the auditor is specialized in the 
client industry on the national level. 
H2b: The positive relation between auditor±client geographic distance and 
Unexpected goodwill impairment is weaker when the auditor is specialized in the 
client industry on the regional level. 
3. MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
3.1 Measurement of Variables 
3.1.1 Unexpected Goodwill Impairment 
Following Beatty and Weber (2006), Bens et al., (2011) and Knauer and Wöhrmann (2015), 
unexpected goodwill impairment is calculated as it will help to clearly examine the effect of 
audit firm geographic proximity and auditor specialization. As this paper is targeting the 
unexpected goodwill impairment, those two variables should negatively affect the positive or 
negative unexpected goodwill impairment. Therefore, the absolute value of unexpected 
goodwill impairment is used as the dependent variable.  
To compute the expected goodwill impairment, an approach suggested by Beatty and Weber 
(2006) for single segment firms and refined by Bens et al., (2011) and Knauer and 
Wöhrmann (2015) for multi-segment firms is used. For single-segment firms, the expected 
impairment is calculated DV WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ WKHSULRUTXDUWHU¶V book value of equity 
and the market value of equity up to the amount of goodwill. If the market value of equity 
exceeds the book value of equity, the expected write-off is set to 0. 
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For multi-VHJPHQW ILUPV WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH SULRU TXDUWHU¶V LPSOLHG ERRN value of 
equity per segment and its implied market value of equity is calculated to measure the 
expected impairment per segment. Therefore, the book value of equity is allocated to each 
segment EDVHG RQ WKH VHJPHQW¶V SULRU \HDU VKDUH RI WRWDO VDOHV 6HFRQG WR HVWLPDWH WKH
implied market YDOXH RI D ILUP WKH VHJPHQW¶V SULRU \HDU VDOHV is multiplied with the sales 
multiple. The sales multiple is calculated as the median ratio of the market value of equity 
over sales of all single segment firms in the same industry (indicated by the first two digits of 
the Industrial Classification Benchmark - ICB). If the implied book value per segment 
exceeds its market value, the difference between these two is the expected impairment 
restricted to the amount of goodwill, which is also assigned to segments based on sales. If the 
implied book value per segment does not exceed its market value, the expected impairment is 
0. Finally, the expected impairments for all segments of a firm are added together to calculate 
the expected impairment per firm. 
As suggested by Bens et al. (2011), this paper uses the single-segment approach also for 
multi-segment firms if the former leads to a higher expected impairment. Further, the single-
segment approach is used when there are less than five peers to calculate the sales multiplier 
for the segments of a multi-segment firm. 
3.1.2 Measurement of Distance 
Following previous literature, the natural log of the physical distance between a firm and its 
auditor is used as the measure for geographic proximity. In particular, the Haversine formula 
(see Shumaker and Sinnott, 1984 for details) is used to calculate the physical distance 
between firm i and its auditor j (DISTANCE) as follows: 
DISTANCEi,j =  ሼሺ݈ܽݐ݅ݐݑ݀݁௜ሻ ܿ݋ݏሺ݈݋݊݃݅ݐݑ݀݁௜ሻ൫݈ܽݐ݅ݐݑ݀ ௝݁൯ ܿ݋ݏ൫݈݋݊݃݅ݐݑ݀݁௝൯+ ሺ݈ܽݐ݅ݐݑ݀݁௜ሻ ݏ݅݊ሺ݈݋݊݃݅ݐݑ݀݁௜ሻ൫݈ܽݐ݅ݐݑ݀ ௝݁൯ ݏ݅݊൫݈݋݊݃݅ݐݑ݀݁௝൯ ൅ሺ݈ܽݐ݅ݐݑ݀݁௜ሻ ݏ݅݊൫݈ܽݐ݅ݐݑ݀ ௝݁൯ሽ⁡?ߨݎȀ⁡?⁡?⁡? 
where r is the radius of the earth (ൎ3,963 miles). 
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3.2 Model Specification 
To test the research hypotheses, both tobit5 and logit regression models are used to test the 
magnitude and the likelihood of unexpected goodwill impairment, respectively. 
Pr(D-UGIi=1) = Į0 + Į1 Specialization + Į2 Distance*Specialization + Į3 other control 
variables + ui              (1) 
UGITAi = Į0 + Į1 Specialization + Į2 Distance*Specialization + Į3 other control variables + 
ui             (2) 
Where: 
Dependent variable  
D-UGIi Dummy variable equal 1 if the firm has a positive value of 
unexpected goodwill impairment, 0 otherwise 
UGITAi Continuous variable: Absolute value of unexpected goodwill 
impairment deflated by lagged total assets 
Independent Variables  
Specialization Dummy variable equal 1 if auditor is specialized, 0 otherwise6 
Geographic Distance Natural logarithm of miles 
Distance*Specialization Interaction term (Distance*Specialization) 
GW/TA Goodwill before impairment of year t deflated by total assets 
before impairment t (Worldscope) 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets (Worldscope) 
Beta Firm beta (Datastream) 
Risk Price volatility (Worldscope) 
Free Float Percentage of shares available to trade (Worldscope) 
Segment (log) Natural logarithm of number of segment (Worldscope) 
Board Diversity Percentage of female on board (Datastream-Assets4) 
% Non-Executives Percentage of nonexecutive directors (Datastream-Assets4) 
CEO Duality Dummy variable equal 1 if the CEO is the chairman of the 
business, 0 otherwise (Datastream-Assets4) 
Cross Listed Dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the use, 0 
otherwise. 
                                                          
5
 Tobit regression is used because data has non-negative values and the majority of them tend to be zero. 
6
 Specialization is measured using the weighted approach proposed by Neal and Riley (2004) 
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4. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1  Sample 
The initial sample consists of all UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) FTSE 
ALL SHARES index. Data is collected for the period 2006 ± 2014, one year behind the 
adoption of IFRS by UK listed firms, to avoid the noise of the adoption year, till the latest 
available data at the time this research has started. Data on the city locations of DXGLWRU¶V
offices are collected manually from the annual reports due to the unavailability of this 
information in all UK databases, while data on the city locations of their client headquarters 
are downloaded from Datastream. Next, postcodes are used to find the latitude and longitude 
GDWD IRU DXGLWRU¶V DQG WKH FOLHQW KHDGTXDUWHUV¶ RIILFHV ZKLFK DUH XVHG WR PHDVXUH WKH
geographical distance between them. List of UK metropolitan areas and their corresponding 
regions are defined using ESPON project 1.4.3 study on Urban Functions issued on March 
20077, and Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (Three levels NUTS) codes of the 
UK maintained by the UK Office for National Statistics8. Data on the percentage of female 
on board and other board characteristic variables are downloaded from ASSET4 through 
Datastream database. Other accounting and financial data are retrieved from Datastream, 
Fame, Osiris. 
As presented in Table 1, Panel A, this research exclude (1) Financial firms because they are 
required to follow industry specific regulations, (2) Firms that do not recognize goodwill in 
their balance sheet in any of the nine years covered in this study, (3) firms with missing audit 
firm name, and (4) firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors or auditors from outside the UK. The 
final sample consists of 347 non-financial firms, reflecting 2194 firm year observations. 
Table 1, Panel B reports the sample distribution across nine industries, following the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB-level 1), with utilities group (industrial group) having the 
lowest (highest) level of representation. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
                                                          
7http://www.espon.eu/export/sites/default/Documents/Projects/ESPON2006Projects/StudiesScientificSupportPr
ojects/UrbanFunctions/fr-1.4.3_April2007-final.pdf 
8http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guidemethod/geograp
hy/beginner-s-guide/eurostat/index.html 
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To measure auditor industry specialization on the national level, audit fees are collected from 
Worldscope-Datastream for 2,239 UK firms (Active and Inactive firms) to. This results in 
12,723 firm year observations over the period from 2006 to 2014. Then, firms audited by 
non-big4 audit firms are excluded resulting in 7,509 firm year observations. Information 
about cities and addresses ZKHUHDXGLWRUV¶RIILFHVDUHORFDWHGDUHFROOHFWHGPDQXDOO\IURPWKH
audit reports following Basioudis and Francis (2007) and McMeeking et al. (2006). This 
results in having 7,502 firm year observations used for measuring specialization on the 
regional level. 
Table 2 illustrates the sample distribution and the Big-4 industry leaders on the national level 
across the 33 London Stock Exchange industry codes (ICB-level 3) in the UK Based on 2006 
± 2014 Audit Fees 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the proportion of firms reporting impairment over years (including and 
excluding 2005). Despite that the total number of firms reporting goodwill is increasing over 
years, the percentage of them reporting goodwill impairment is decreasing. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
As presented in Figure 1, the percentage of firms impairing goodwill was the highest in 2005, 
the year where UK companies listed on the LSE were required to adopt IFRS and to test their 
goodwill for impairment by the end of the year. After that, firms manged to avoid the 
reporting of goodwill impairment till the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, where it is 
doubled from 10.78% to 20.43%. Again, over the following years, firms managed to avoid 
the reporting of goodwill impairment, and the trend almost shows a continuous reduction in 
the percentage of impairment reporting till it reached 11.23% in 2014, the last year in the 
research sample. 
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Table 4, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the whole sample. Approximately 16% 
percent of firms report goodwill impairment, while the mean value of goodwill impairment 
reported approach 0% with a maximum value of 47% of total assets. This gives an indication 
that firms tend to avoid reporting impairment. Goodwill an average (median) of 20% (16%) 
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of Total assets, with a maximum value of 74%. This gives an indication of the materiality of 
Goodwill to company total assets on average. The percentage of female on board represents 
an average (median) of 12% (11%), up to a maximum of 50% of the board members. This 
shows a higher percentage of participation that its effect should be considered on the 
reporting of goodwill impairment. The mean (median) value of distance in miles between 
auditors and clients is approximately 25% (10%) with a minimum of 0.05 mile. The 75% 
percentile of 30-mile distance indicates that 75% percent of the sample chose to auditors 
located close to their headquarters. However, we still have around 250 (195) firm year 
observations with auditors located 80(100) miles away from their headquarters up to a 
maximum of 398 miles. The mean (median) risk of firms (proxied by price volatility) in the 
sample is 27 (26), while firm beta has an average (median) of 0.83 (0.79). The percentage of 
non-executive directors represents an average (median) of 64.6% (63.6%), the average 
percentage of CEOs who simultaneously are chairman is 4%, and the average of firms cross 
listed in US market is 35%. 
Table 4, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the two groups of sample (Impairment 
sample & Control Sample). It shows that firms reported goodwill impairment tend to have 
larger amount of goodwill, bigger in size, but less riskier firms not reporting goodwill 
impairment. This might give an indication that some firms of the control sample are 
manipulating to avoid the reporting of goodwill impairment. Table 4, Panel C show pearson 
correlation matrix. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
5. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
Table 5, Panel A presents results for the logit model used to test the effect of geographic 
distance, auditor industry specialization, the interaction between them, and finally board 
member diversity on the likelihood of having unexpected goodwill impairment. Model 1 
show results if specialization is measured on the national level, where model 2 shows 
specialization measured on the region level. Findings show a strongly significant positive 
relationship at 1% between Geographic distance, measure by log of miles, and the likelihood 
of having unexpected goodwill impairment. This indicates that the greater the distance 
between audit firm and the client headquarter, the less likely that auditors might control 
management from manipulating the impairment test and reporting more/less goodwill 
impairment than it should be. This might be because larger distance between the auditor and 
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the client results in greater information asymmetry between clients and auditors. However, 
interestingly, when the auditor is specialized on the regional level, his expertise and 
knowledge helps to reduce the information asymmetry problems and become better able to 
challenge the management on the estimates and assumptions they have used, and thus 
constrain them from using goodwill impairment as a tool for managing their earnings. This 
supports the idea that auditors specialized on the regional level are better able to reduce the 
likelihood of having unexpected goodwill impairment than non-specialized auditors. 
Therefore, we can argue that if we have two auditors located at the same geographical 
distance from their clients, and one of them is recognised as specialized on the regional level, 
specialized auditor will have a higher chance of providing a higher audit quality, through 
constraining management from recording more/less goodwill impairment than it should be. 
This result demonstrates that knowledge and expertise are shared only between audit partners 
and offices located in the same region.  
Regarding the other control variables, results show a 10% significant negative relationship (in 
the 2 models) between percentage of female on board and the likelihood of reporting 
unexpected impairment. This supports the idea the female board members are more ethical 
and reluctant to opportunistically use the discretion involved the process of testing goodwill 
for impairment. Furthermore, findings display that big firms are more likely to report 
unexpected goodwill impairment. Moreover, the higher price volatility (risk), the more likely 
that firms report unexpected impairments. As expected, results also show that when the CEO 
is the chairman of the company, he tends to exercise some power to manipulate the amount of 
goodwill impaired and report more/less than should be in the way that serves his interests. 
Table 5, Panel B presents results for the Tobit regression model used to examine the effect on 
the magnitude of unexpected goodwill impairment reported. Results from this regression 
model confirm the same results extracted from the logit model except for specialization, as 
findings show a negative but insignificant effect of auditor industry specialization on both 
levels on the amount of unexpected goodwill impairment reported. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
This research contributes to the literature in goodwill impairment and audit quality in several 
ways. First, it is one of the first studies that examine the effect of auditor industry 
specialization in the UK on the reporting of goodwill impairment, investigating whether 
DXGLWRUV¶knowledge and expertise are shared between audit partners and offices on a national 
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or a regional level. Furthermore, it is the first to explore the effect of geographic distance 
between auditors and clients in the UK on the quality of audit provided, and the effect of 
auditor industry specialization as a moderator variable on this relationship.  
Results of this research are important for auditors and investors, as audit firms should work 
on spreading their offices and avoid to be centralized in large cities. This would help them to 
better able to offer higher audit quality through being close to their clients collecting more 
information and conducting more audit tests, and thus reducing information asymmetry 
problems. Finally, resuOWV DERXW WKH ERDUG PHPEHUV¶ GLYHUVLW\ RQ ERDUG DUH RI JUHDW
importance to regulators and policy makes, as imposing a compulsory quota for women 
participation on board for UK companies, rather than voluntary choice, would help to 
improve the quality of the reporting, especially the reporting of accounting items that are 
affected by management discretion such as goodwill. 
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Table 1 ± Sample Selection and Distribution by Industry 
Panel A ± Sample Selection Procedures Firm Firm year observations 
UK firms listed in FTSE ALL Shares 
index 
634 5,294 
(-) Financial firms 287 2,583 
(-) Firms with no goodwill over the entire 
period 
  
332 
(-) Firms with missing audit firm name  28 
(-) Firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors or 
auditors from outside the UK 
(-) Observations with missing control 
variables 
  
157 
 
809 
Final number of firm-year observations  1,385 
 
Panel B ± Sample Distribution 
by industry 
All Firms with 
Goodwill 
 Exclude Missing 
observations 
No. of 
Firms % 
 No. of 
Firms % 
Basic Materials 148 6.75  81 5.85 
Consumer Goods 249 11.35  181 13.07 
Consumer Services 521 23.75  387 27.94 
Health Care 101 4.6  60 4.33 
Industrials 861 39.24  475 34.30 
Oil & Gas 88 4.01  44 3.18 
Technology 120 5.47  72 5.20 
Telecommunications 47 2.14  27 1.95 
Utilities 59 2.69  58 4.19 
Total 2,194 100  1,385 100 
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Table  ± Sample Distribution and Big-4 industry leaders on the national level Based on 2006 ± 2014 Audit Fees 
SIC ICB SECTOR NAME Observation per SIC % 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
530 Oil & Gas Producers 338 4.5 EY EY EY EY EY EY EY EY EY 
570 Oil Equipment & Services 78 1.04 KPMG KPMG PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC EY EY 
580 Alternative Energy 38 0.51 EY EY KPMG KPMG PWC PWC PWC PWC KPMG 
1350 Chemicals 169 2.25 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG & 
PWC 
PWC PWC KPMG KPMG KPMG 
1730 Forestry & Paper 22 0.29 DT DT DT DT DT DT DT DT DT 
1750 Industrial Metals & Mining 34 0.45 PWC EY EY EY EY EY EY EY EY 
1770 Mining 248 3.3 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC DT DT 
2350 Construction & Materials 241 3.21 KPMG DT DT DT DT DT DT DT DT 
2710 Aerospace & Defence 114 1.52 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
2720 General Industrials 115 1.53 PWC PWC DT PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 213 2.84 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
2750 Industrial Engineering 341 4.54 KPMG KPMG KPMG EY EY EY EY EY EY 
2770 Industrial Transportation 200 2.66 PWC PWC PWC KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG EY 
2790 Support Services 1,056 14.06 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
3350 Automobiles & Parts 35 0.47 KPMG PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
3530 Beverages 51 0.68 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
3570 Food Producers 213 2.84 PWC DT KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
3720 Household Goods & Home Construction 294 3.92 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
3740 Leisure Goods 50 0.67 PWC PWC EY PWC PWC PWC KPMG KPMG KPMG 
3760 Personal Goods 94 1.25 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC KPMG 
3780 Tobacco 20 0.27 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
4530 Health Care Equipment & Services 245 3.26 PWC EY EY EY EY EY EY EY EY 
4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 366 4.87 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
5330 Food & Drug Retailers 96 1.28 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
5370 General Retailers 536 7.14 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
5550 Media 473 6.3 PWC PWC DT DT DT DT DT DT DT 
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5750 Travel & Leisure 665 8.86 PWC PWC EY EY EY PWC PWC PWC PWC 
6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 53 0.71 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
6570 Mobile Telecommunications 46 0.61 DT DT DT DT DT DT DT DT DT 
7530 Electricity 53 0.71 PWC PWC KPMG EY KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
7570 Gas, Water & Multiutilities 135 1.8 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
9530 Software & Computer Services 672 8.95 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC EY PWC KPMG 
9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment 205 2.73 EY EY EY EY EY EY EY EY EY 
 
Total 7,509 100 
 
        ____________________________________   
 
Audit Firm Definitions: 
 
DT       =  Deloitte & Touche 
EY       =  Ernst & Young 
KPMG =  KPMG 
PWC    =  PricewaterhouseCoopers 
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Table 3 ± Proportion of Firms Reporting Impairment over Years 
Year 
 
Goodwill Impairment Total 
Observations Yes No 
2005 No of Obs. 44 160 204 
Percentage 21.57% 78.43% 
2006 No of Obs. 37 180 217 
Percentage 17.05% 82.95% 
2007 No of Obs. 25 207 232 
Percentage 10.78% 89.22% 
2008 No of Obs. 45 187 232 
Percentage 19.4% 80.6% 
2009 No of Obs. 48 187 235 
Percentage 20.43% 79.57% 
2010 No of Obs. 35 207 242 
Percentage 14.46% 85.54% 
2011 No of Obs. 40 210 250 
Percentage 16% 84% 
2012 No of Obs. 36 214 250 
Percentage 14.4% 85.6% 
2013 No of Obs. 40 220 260 
Percentage 15.38% 84.62% 
2014 No of Obs. 31 245 276 
Percentage 11.23% 88.77% 
Total including 
2005 
No of Obs. 381 2017 2,398 
Percentage 15.89 84.11 
Total Without 
2005 
No of Obs. 337 1,857 2,194 
Percentage 15.36 84.64 
 
Figure 1 ± Percentage of Firms Reporting Impairment over Years 
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Table 4 ± Descriptive Statistics and Correlation for Firm Year Observations for the 
Years 2006 ± 2014 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Whole Sample 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min p(25) Median p(75) Max 
IMP/TA 1385 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.47 
DIMP 1385 0.16 0.37 0 0 0 0 1 
UnExp IMP/TA 1385 0.02 0.05 0 0 0 0 0.93 
GW/TA 1385 0.2 0.16 0 0.07 0.16 0.32 0.74 
Board Diversity 1385 11.93 10.2 0 0 11.11 18.75 50 
Specialization 1385 0.71 0.45 0 0 1 1 1 
Distance (log) 1385 1.98 1.82 -3.24 0.48 2.27 3.39 5.99 
Distance (Miles) 1385 24.79 44.43 0.04 1.62 9.68 29.52 397.89 
Size 1385 14.51 1.53 10.33 13.4 14.35 15.38 19.05 
Beta 1385 0.83 0.66 -0.97 0.43 0.79 1.12 4.35 
Risk 1385 27.21 8.47 12.34 21.38 26.05 31.69 57.79 
Free Float 1385 83.78 15.65 16 77 88 95 100 
log Segment 1385 1.05 0.62 0 0.69 1.1 1.61 2.3 
% Non-Executives 1385 64.56 11.65 27.78 55.56 63.64 73.33 100 
CEO Duality 1385 0.04 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 
Cross listed 1385 0.35 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Each Group    
 Impairment Sample (N = 226)  Control Sample (N = 1159)  
Variable N Mean Median S.D.  N Mean Median S.D. Mean Diff Unequalt-test 
GW/TA 226 0.24 0.23 0.16  1159 0.19 0.15 0.16 -0.05*** -4.15 
Board Diversity 226 11.03 11.11 9.77  1159 12.11 11.11 10.27     1.08 1.50 
Specialization 226 0.7 1 0.46  1159 0.72 1 0.45     0.02 0.35 
Geographic Distance 226 1.82 1.93 1.8  1159 2.01 2.41 1.82      0.19 1.46 
Size 226 15.12 14.8 1.56  1159 14.39 14.22 1.5    -0.73*** -6.45 
Beta 226 0.73 0.7 0.66  1159 0.84 0.81 0.66     0.11* 2.43 
Risk 226 28.07 26.95 9.42  1159 27.04 25.91 8.27    -1.03 -1.54 
Free Float 226 86.57 90 15.58  1159 83.24 88 15.61    -3.33** -2.94 
log Segment 226 1.11 1.1 0.59  1159 1.04 1.1 0.63    -0.07 -1.75 
% Non-Executives 226 65.95 66.67 12.04  1159 64.29 63.64 11.55    -1.66 -1.91 
CEO Duality 226 0.07 0 0.25  1159 0.04 0 0.19    -0.03 -1.62 
Cross listed 226 0.4 0 0.49  1159 0.34 0 0.48    -0.06 -1.67 
* p<0.05       ** p<0.01      *** p<0.001  
 
Panel C: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Board Diversity         1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (2) Specialization  0.111***         1  
    (3) Geographic Distance -0.134*** -0.133***          1  
    (4) Distance*Specialization -0.0672*  0.473***  0.685***       
(4) GW/TA  0.019 -0.026 -0.101***         1  
    (5) Size  0.287***  0.161*** -0.230***   0.001         1  
    (6) Beta  0.016  0.003 -0.141*** -0.035 0.105***        1  
    (7) Price Volatility -0.189*** -0.033   0.040 -0.112*** -0.345***  0.022        1  
    (8) Free Float  0.199*** -0.080** -0.011  0.101***  0.267***  0.104*** -0.202***         1 
    (9) log Segment  0.074**  0.068* -0.062*  0.131***  0.213***  0.043 -0.105***  0.143***         1 
   (10) % Non-Executives  0.260***  0.104*** -0.138***  0.040  0.395***  0.128*** -0.127***  0.072**  0.050          1 
  (11) CEO Duality  0.010  0.039  0.019  0.042 -0.077** -0.107*** -0.003 -0.248*** -0.041 -0.104***          1 
 (12) Cross Listed  0.260***  0.124*** -0.196***  0.002  0.625***  0.183*** -0.295***  0.226***  0.135***  0.339*** -0.059* 1 
* p<0.05     ** p<0.01     *** p<0.001  
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Table 5 ± Geographic Proximity, Gender Diversity on Board, Likelihood of Unexpected 
Impairment, and Size of Unexpected Impairment 
Panel A ± Logit Model 
Prediction 
(1) 
National Level 
(2) 
Region Level Dependent Var: Absolute Unexpected IMP 
Specialization ± 0.00399 0.630** 
  (0.240) (0.296) 
Geographic Distance + 0.214*** 0.344*** 
  (0.0722) (0.0939) 
Distance*Specialization ± -0.126 -0.261*** 
  (0.0833) (0.101) 
GW/TA + 1.894*** 1.994*** 
  (0.446) (0.446) 
Size ? 0.962*** 0.924*** 
  (0.127) (0.126) 
Beta + -0.186 -0.203 
  (0.145) (0.146) 
Risk + 0.706*** 0.706*** 
  (0.0894) (0.0887) 
Free Float ? 0.169 0.212* 
  (0.110) (0.109) 
Segment (log) ? 0.146 0.131 
  (0.113) (0.111) 
Board Diversity ±  -0.00534* -0.00557* 
  (0.00292) (0.00290) 
% Non-Executives ± -0.0772 -0.0757 
  (0.0841) (0.0846) 
CEO Duality + 0.980*** 0.977*** 
  (0.312) (0.308) 
Cross Listed ± -0.0862 -0.137 
  (0.191) (0.194) 
Constant  -1.728*** -2.164*** 
  (0.495) (0.547) 
    
Observations  1,385 1,385 
Industry Fixed Effect  YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect  YES YES 
Pseudo R2          0.1561 0.1568 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B ± Tobit Model 
Prediction (1) National Level 
(2) 
Region Level Dependent Var: Absolute Unexpected IMP 
Specialization ± -0.0169 0.0226 
  (0.0160) (0.0181) 
Geographic Distance + 0.0122*** 0.0209*** 
  (0.00435) (0.00564) 
Distance*Specialization ± -0.00472 -0.0137** 
  (0.00485) (0.00598) 
GW/TA + 0.147*** 0.160*** 
  (0.0280) (0.0296) 
Size ? 0.0316*** 0.0298*** 
  (0.00559) (0.00520) 
Beta + -0.000560 -0.00225 
  (0.0106) (0.0106) 
Risk + 7.20e-05 0.000235 
  (0.000284) (0.000294) 
Free Float ? 0.00429*** 0.00430*** 
  (0.000566) (0.000562) 
Segment (log) ? 0.00829 0.00785 
  (0.00629) (0.00611) 
Board Diversity ±  -0.000291* -0.000326* 
  (0.000169) (0.000176) 
% Non-Executives ± -0.000394 -0.000395 
  (0.000452) (0.000461) 
CEO Duality + 0.0396** 0.0392** 
  (0.0159) (0.0164) 
Cross Listed ± -0.000541 -0.00330 
  (0.0114) (0.0119) 
Constant  -0.693*** -0.704*** 
  (0.0978) (0.104) 
    
Observations  1,385 1,385 
Industry Fixed Effect  YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect  YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
